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Abstract
This paper examines the ways in which the French income tax impacts
family behavior and suggests some areas for future research.

Income Tax Treatment of the Family in France
After a quarter of a century of discussion and resistance, a
general income tax was introduced in France in 1914. The tax, which
took effect in 1915, was levied at a rate of 2 percent on net income
in excess of 5000 F. The economic situation of the family was recognized
through an additional exemption of 2000 F for married couples plus a
1000 F exemption for each child.
During the Second World War, the rates on the income tax were
increased, and the tax became highly progressive. In 1945, the exemp-
tion system gave way to the "quotient familial." Under the quotient,
income of the family is divided into a number of parts depending on
the number of persons in the family. A progressive rate schedule is
applied and the resulting tax liability is multiplied by the number of
parts.
According to the current quotient familial, one part is allowed for
a single, widowed, or divorced person, and two parts are allowed for
married couples. Married couples with dependent children are allocated
an additional half part for each child, except for the fifth child
2
which accounts for a full part under the tax law of 1980. In addition,
special provisions are made for disabled children, and for single,
divorced, or widowed persons with children.
Besides the quotient familial, there are several other provisions
in the French income tax which affect families. For example, a child
care deduction of up to 3,000 F per child is available to single parent
households with children under 4 years of age. A similar deduction is
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not available to married couples with preschool children. Other deduc-
tions, such as the housing deduction are subject to limits depending
on the size of the family. In the case of the housing deduction,
which is primarily a deduction for mortgage interest, the limit is
7,000 F per year plus 1,000 F per dependent.
For each part of taxable income, the tax schedule applying to income
of 1979 is shown in Table 1. After application of the rate schedule,
the resulting figure is multiplied by the number of parts to obtain the
family's tax liability. For instance, in 1979, a married couple with
two children paid an income tax as indicated in Table 2.
Since the tax per part is progressive, the French income tax favors
additional children. Tables 3 and 4 show the tax liability and tax
saving per additional child for a married couple at different income
levels in 1979. Note that the incremental saving per child decreases
as the number of children increases, holding income constant, except
for the fifth child which accounts for an additional half part. Further,
an additional child is more valuable in terras of tax savings to a high
income family than to a low income family.
The French income tax also favors marriage except among people with
substantially equal incomes. Table 5 shows that the saving from marriage
varies negatively with the equality of the income distribution between
the spouses, with the greatest gains from marriage being realized when
one spouse has all the income. For a marriage with a 30 year life
expectancy, these tax savings can be substantial. See Table 6.
\t the ?-an? tinic, tho Frar.ch ir.cone t=.:: contains some perverse
incentives for divorce among couples with children. This is due to
-3-
Table 1: Schedule of income tax rates
applying to each part of income, 1979.
Bracket Rate in percent
8,725 F or less
8,725 F to 9,125 F 5
9,125 F to 10,825 F 10
10,825 F to 17,125 F 15
17,125 F to 22,275 F 20
22,275 F to 28,000 F 25
28,000 F to 33,875 F 30
33,875 F to 39,075 F 35
39,075 F to 65,125 F 40
65,125 F to 89,575 F 45
89,575 F to 105,950 F 50
105,950 F to 125,050 F 55
More than 125,050 F 60
Source: Ministere du Budget, Precis de Fiscalite, 1980, p. 69.
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Table 2: Income tax liability of a
married couple with two children,
1979 (in FF)





Table 3: Income tax liability of a
married couple by income level
and number of children, 1979 (in FF)
Annual income Number of children12 3 4 5
20,000
60,000 8,393 6,491 5,130 3,985 3,265 1,831
100,000 23,098 18,872 15,589 13,187 11,385 8,550
200,000 67,628 60,731 54,878 50,421 46,195 37,744
-6-
Table 4: Tax saving for each additional







First Second Third Fourth Fifth
1,902 1,361 1,145 720 1,434
4,226 3,283 2,402 1,802 2,335
6,897 5,853 4,457 4,226 8,451
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Table 5: Tax savings through marriage
by income level and distribution of
















Table 6: Tax saving through marriage
by income level and length of
marriage, 1979 (in FF)a
Present value of tax saving
Total Life Life Life
family expectancy of expectancy of expectancy of
income 10 years 20 years 30 years
10,000 893 1,497 1,905
20,000 12,364 20,721 26,272
60,000 59,180 99,182 126,232
100,000 88,621 148,524 189,030
200,000 203,740 341,455 434,579
p
Assumes no children. One spouse receives all the couple's aggregate
income.
Computed using an interest rate of 4 percent a year.
a^.**"* .; i*' *•-• 1 ..'r.^ #< «tv fWv.h.r'A X^*^ «# nr
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the extra half part per spouse under the quotient familial, to the
child care credit for single parent families, and to the limit on the
housing deduction. To take an extreme example, consider a couple with
two children under four years of age. Table 7 shows the gain from
divorce at different income levels if each parent claims one child as
a dependent, and each makes full use of the housing deduction. For
these tax savings to be large, each spouse has to have a substantial
3
salary. Otherwise the tax system strongly favors marriage.
The decision whether or not to enter the labor force is also poten-
tially affected by the tax system. Here it is useful to distinguish
between primary workers, persons for whom the question of whether or
not to enter the labor force is not in doubt, and secondary workers,
who may choose to work or not depending on the opportunities. Married
women are an important part of this second group. For secondary workers,
the labor force participation decision depends on the marginal rate of
tax, which, in tax systems such as the French one where income is
aggregated for tax purposes, depends on the earnings of the spouse.
Table 8 shows a comparison of the marginal and average rates of French
income tax by income level for 1979 for a married couple with no
children. The marginal tax rate reaches a maximum of 60 percent.
How important are these incentives in the French tax system? To
date, there have been no empirical studies on the effect of taxation
on fertility or family formation. There has, however, been substan-
tial research on the impact of taxation on the work decision. This
research has been stimulated in part- hy the ready availability of data
10-
Table 7: Tax saving from divorce
for a couple with two preschool






^ , 100,000 6,449
200,000 13,250
a
Assumes income equally divided between the spouses, each parent claims
one child as a dependent, and each parent makes full use of his/her housing
deduction.
Total family income before housing and child care deductions.
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Table 8: Marginal and average rates
of tax facing a married couple with














on labor supply, and, in part, by the indeterminancy of economic theory
in evaluating the impact of taxation on work behavior.
Theory suggests that a tax on earnings has two opposing effects on
the work, decision. The tax, by lowering the net return for work, dis-
courages work through a substitution effect. At the same time, the
tax reduces after-tax income, making it more difficult to realize
commitments, influencing people to work harder. This latter effect is
called the income effect. In a family context, there are also cross-
effects, whereby a reduction in the net wage of one's spouse affects
one's own work decision. The final result of these opposing effects
cannot be answered by theory alone.
One of the earliest studies to explore the effect of taxation on
v/ork behavior was by Kosters (1969) who developed and estimated a
family labor supply model. Using cross-section data drawn from the
one-in-a-thousand sample of the 1960 U.S. Census, he estimated hours
worked functions for male heads of households, 50-64 years old. He
found wage rate elasticity estimates to be negative and significant;
however, estimates of the income elasticity were generally insignificant.
He concluded that the compensated wage elasticity for males is close
to zero and that a change in the income tax rate is likely to have a
small effect on the labor supply of male primary workers.
The evidence on secondary, married female, workers is quite differ-
ent, however. Rosen (1976) used data from the 1967 Survey of Work
Experience for U.S. Women, 30-44 years of age, to examine the impact
of tax rates on the labor supply of married women. Explicit attention
was focused on the extent to which individuals react to the net rather
-13-
than the gross wage. In the study, Rosen tested the hypothesis that
workers react to income tax increases in the same manner as they respond
to any other reduction in net earnings. He found no evidence of tax
illusion among married women workers, but did find women's labor supply
to be highly responsive to changes in the tax rate.
In a series of studies using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of U.S. Women, ages 30-44 years in 1967, 1969, and 1971, I ex-
amined in more detail the impact of taxation on the work behavior of
4
families. Based on a probit estimation of a conditional probability
model of labor force participation, I found that taxes have a negative
impact on the labor force participation of married women. Ordinary
least squares estimation of an hours equation for working wives also
uncovered a negative influence of taxation on the work decision. When
the model was extended to two-earner families and labor supply functions
estimated for both husbands and wives, negative tax elasticities were
discovered for wives and positive elasticities for husbands. According
to these results, an increase in taxation leads to a reallocation of
labor time among family members with the wife decreasing and the husband
increasing the share of total family time spent working outside the home.
Researchers have just begun to scratch the surface in the study of
the impact of taxation on the family and on family behavior. This
paper concludes with a discussion of possible directions for future
research.
One interesting area for future research is on the potential effect
of converting tha French income tax frDn a faiil'- basis tc; aa i.idi vidua!
basis. Among OECD countries in recent years, there has been a strong
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trend away from compulsory joint or family taxation towards individual
taxation. As of 1977, individual taxation was allowed in seventeen
OECD countries and was compulsory in thirteen. Research is needed to
highlight the shifts in relative tax burdens involved in moving from
the family to the individual as the unit of taxation.
A second area for future research is on the responsiveness of family
behavior to changes in the marginal tax rates. One consequence of
individual taxation is to dramatically lower the marginal tax rate on
secondary workers in the family. If the results of American empirical
studies can be applied to France, increases in female labor force parti-
cipation could be expected. Studies using French data are obviously
needed to confirm this result. In making these studies, particular
attention should be paid to non-linearities and discontinuities in the
tax system which might affect labor force behavior.
Finally, the influence of the French income tax on other aspects of
family decision-making such as occupation choice, investment in human
capital, the allocation of time to non-market activities, fertility,
and marriage need to be studied. By their nature, these are life-cycle
decisions best treated within a dynamic framework. Recent advances in
modeling life-cycle family behavior by Ghez and Becker (1975), Smith
(1972), and Heckman and McCurdy (1980) open the way for studying the
impact of taxation on life-cycle family decisions. Longitudinal data
are needed to implement these models for the French tax system.
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FOOTNOTES
See Neurrisse (1978) for an in depth account of the development of
the French income tax.
2
Dependent children fall into several categories. To quality as a
dependent for tax purposes, a child must be single and less than 18
years of age. Children over 18 years of age may be claimed as depen-
dents if they are under 21 and living at home, a student under 25 years
of age, or in the military service. Married children, parents, and
brothers or sisters may also be treated as dependents under certain cir-
cumstances.
3
For a discussion of the penalty to marriage within the French tax
system, see Philippe (1980).
4
See Leuthold (1978 a and b, 1979).
^OECD (1977), p. 15.
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